Daniel Dennett, in "Conditions of Personhood," Richard Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) , writes on the concept of a person.
In this paper I shall a) discuss Dennett's six conditions for personhood, b) offer objections to some of his conditions and c) show how his concept of a person may be, in one sense, too broad and, in another, too narrow.
Dennett doubts whether we can ever come up with a satisfactory theory of personhood. He cautions: "In the end we may come to realize that the concept of a person is incoherent and obsolete." This is in spite of the fact that "it is difficult or even impossible to conceive of what it would be like if we abandoned the concept . . .
(p. 175).
For Dennett, it turns out that we lack objective criteria for applying the notion, and accordingly, it may add nothing to our knowledge.
But aside from incoherence and obsolescence, a concept of the person could fail in being empty. Dennett states: "If then the concept of a person is in some way an ineliminable part of our conceptual scheme, it might still be in rather worse shape than we would like. It might turn out, for instance, that the concept of a person is only a free-floating honorific that we are all happy to apply to ourselves, and to others as the spirit moves us, guided by our emotions, aesthetic sensibilities, considerations of policy, and the like, just as those who are chic are all and only those who can get themselves considered chic by others who consider themselves chic. Being a person is certainly something like that, and if it were no more, we would have to reconsider if we could the importance with which we now endow the concept" (p. 176).''' This then is the Scylla and Charibdis that an adequate theory of the person must avoid. That is, such a theory must show why the concept is coherent and usable on the one hand, and unlike the concept of chic, on the other.
To add to our problems, we seem to have two separate but intertwining ideas of a person: the metaphysical and the moral.
As to the former, it stipulates that a thing is a person only if, roughly, it is an intelligent, conscious, feeling agent. The moral concept of a person is of a being who is morally accountable; it is appropriate either to praise or blame or ascribe to him rights and responsibilities. So the philosopher's task becomes suitably complicated as he considers the question: "Does the metaphysical notion [of a person] . . . coincide with the moral notion?" (p. 176).
Dennett does not even attempt to solve all of these problems and come up with a comprehensive theory of the person.
Instead, he outlines six necessary conditions for a thing's being a person in the moral sense. He conceives of his task as follows: "What will be at issue here is first, how . . . they [the six conditions] are dependent on each other; second, why they are necessary conditions of moral personhood, and third, why it is so hard to say whether they are jointly sufficient conditions for moral personhood" (p. 177). Dennett tries to answer all three questions. Now, I shall present Dennett's six conditions. They are as follows:
1)
"The first and most obvious theme is that persons are rational beings" (p. 177).
Dennett does not fully discuss what he means here. However, for him, rationality seems to involve at least as much and possibly more than following the economist's principle of rationality. The latter states: an agent is rational just in case he maximizes his utility (or profit) and minimizes his disutility (or cost).
This rule does not legislate ends, but rather stipulates that someone's being rational is that entity's choosing the most effective means to an end, i.e., the one which will maximize his benefit. Dennett may also have in mind something like Aristotle's concept of "reasonableness": a notion that there are some ends, e.g., misery, that it is never rational to choose. A rational being is, so to speak, a sensible being.
2)
"The second theme is that persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which psychological or mental or Intentional predicates, are ascribed" (p. 177). The term "Intention" (with a largecase "I") is a technical one for Dennett. It does not mean intentions in the ordinary sense, i.e., it does not refer to motives or purposes alone. The term instead refers to any mental state, e.g., volition, emotion, feeling, intention, imagination, etc., which we would normally say is about something.
That is to say, an emotion, like fear, is never simply fear. It is always fear of something. And hope may spring eternal, but it is hope that something will happen. Or consciousness is always consciousness of something. And thus the term "is conscious" is an Intentional predicate in Dennett's usage.
I will speak more about this below, as well as explain the significance of Intentions.
3)
"The third theme is that, whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it. This theme suggests that it is not the case that once we have established the objective fact that something is a person we treat him or her or it in a certain way, but that our treating him or her or it this certain way is somehow and to some extent constitutive of him or her or it being a person" (pp. 177-8).
I want to introduce a distinction which, I think, will enable us to understand Dennett more clearly.
Namely, I wish to distinguish between someone's being a person de re and his being a person de dictu. X's being a person de re involves X's really being a person, i.e., it entails that it is an objective fact that he meet Dennett's conditions of personhood.
Take the Untermenschen in Nazi Germany, for example, the Jews.
If anything can count as such, they were, in fact, persons. And this was true, regardless of the stance that the rulers of Germany, or anybody else, adopted toward them, namely, that they were nonpersons.
In short, in the de re sense, it is. not the case that a thing is a person if and only if we treat it as such. But in the de dictu sense of "being a person", this would be true. This is perhaps what Dennett had in mind when he said that the concept of a person is something (although of course not entirely) like the concept of chic. A person is never de re chic, i.e., there are no objective criteria to establish whether "chic" is true of him. He is chic if and only if people adopt a certain stance toward him. He is chic de dictu. Similarly, stance is constitutive of a thing's in the de dictu sense, being a pex'son. This will be the stance, needless to say, that ascribes to it the conditions of personhood.
4)
"The fourth theme is that the object toward which this personal stance is taken must . . . There may in every case be other ways of predicting and explaining the behavior of an Intentional system, for instance, mechanistic or physical ways, but the Intentional stance may be the handiest or most effective or in any case a successful stance to adopt, which suffices for the object to be an Intentional system" (p. 179).
An object is an Intentional system if and only if we can appropriately or justly or correctly say of it that it performed an act, or caused an event because it wanted to, or because it believed that it was the right thing to do, or because it feared the consequences if it did not, etc. Or in other words, a system is Intentional just in case we can explain or predict its behavior, to employ an old scholastic term, in teleological ways. If it is appropriate to ask of it "Why did it do that?" and receive an answer in terms of Intentions, then that object or system is an Intentional one.
Dennett goes on to say that "It is important to recognize how bland this definition of Intentional system is, and how correspondingly large the class of Intentional systems can be.
If, for instance, 1 predict that a particular plant-say a potted ivy, will grow around a corner and up into the light because it 'seeks' the light and 'wants' to get out of the shade it now finds itself in, and 'expects' or 'hopes* there is light around the corner, I have adoped the Intentional stance toward the plant and, lo and behold, within very narrow limits it works" (pp. 179-80).
But further, we could treat a chessplaying computer as wanting to win the game. And for that matter, if it were a successful stance to take towards them, then stones or other inanimate objects would be Intentional systems.
It is important to realize some of the implications of the notion of an Intentional system.
It is not simply that we can adopt the Intentional stance correctly toward only those objects which are objectively Intentional systems.
For we may never, for Dennett, be able to do so with objective validity.
So he is not using "being an Intentional system" in the de re sense. He is using it, rather, in the de dictu sense, i.e., he is saying that an object is an Intentional system just in case we adopt the Intentional stance toward it.
If we ascx'ibe Intentions to an object, that constitutes its being an Intentional system.
We can understand the condition of reciprocity in terms of Intentional systems. Dennett says: "Let us define a second-order Intentional system as one to which we ascribe not only simple beliefs, desires and other Intentions, but beliefs, desires, and other Intentions about beliefs, desires, and other
Intentions. An Intentional system S would be a second-order Intentional system if among the ascriptions we make to it are such as S believes that T desires that p_, S hopes that T fears that g, and reflexive cases like S believes that S desires that p_" (p. 181). Reciprocity is simply the ability to form second-order Intentions. Paradigmatically, they may be about other agents' Intentions, but they need not be. And once again, a wide class of objects could be secondorder Intentional systems.
We can ascribe second-order Intentionality to animals. Dennett gives the example of a dog who goes to the door, seems to want to get out, thus getting her Master to go to the door. The dog proceeds to hop on her Master's chair. We would say, for Dennett, that the dog hoped that her Master would believe she wanted out.
This would not only be a second-order, but possibly a third-order Intention. Dennett says:
"We can make this point more general : where x is attempting to induce behavior in y_ which is inappropriate to y's true environment and needs but appropriate to y_'s perceived or believed environment and needs, we are forced to ascribe second-order Intentions to x" (p. 183).
X could even be a tree. Dennett gives the example of apple-growers "tricking" an apple tree into "thinking it's spring" by building a small fire under its branches in the late fall.
It will bloom. Any time ascription of secondorder Intentions will help us understand or predict behavior, we are justified in so ascribing them.
And once more, it does not matter whether these predicates are objectively true of the thing in question.
For we are using the Intentional predicates once again in the de dictu sense, it is our attitude which constitutes a thing's being a second-order Intentional system. So it is this attitude which is essential to moral personhood. In short, a thing cannot be a person, in the de dictu sense, unless we adopt the stance toward it that it is a secondorder Intentional system. Finally, we can understand the condition of selfawareness in terms of reciprocity.
The former simply is a special case of the latter, involving, second-order volitions. A second-order voliiton is an Intention about one of our desires.
I have a desire to stop writing this paper and to run down the street screaming. I have another desire about that desire, namely, to suppress it.
My desire to suppress a desire is a second-order desire. And a thing cannot be a person, unless we ascribe secondorder volitions to it. Now, there are some problems with equating the special way in which we must be self-aware with second-order volitions.
For one thing, the latter is a technical notion that seems very difficult to match up with our ordinary concept of self-consciousness. When I am aware of myself, must I be aware of some of my Intentions?
Why cannot I just be aware of me? And if I can be self-aware without consciousness of Intentions, then, I am inclined to think, I need not have a second-order volition.to be self-aware. But then self-awareness is not identical to having second-order volitions. But I shall not develop this objection, and proceed to some more serious ones.
My main criticisms of Dennett divide neatly into two categories: a) I find difficulties with his notion that second-order Intentions and volitions are necessary for full moral personhood, and b) I find that if we take "being a person" in the de dictu sense, Dennett provides us with too broad a line of demarcation for personhood. If, on the other hand, we take "being a person" in a de re sense, Dennett's views suffer the opposite failing, and provide a much too narrow criterion for personhood.
As to (a): I would like to begin with a discussion of two unfortunates. There is Jones, who due to an accident is paralyzed, deaf, dumb, and blind, and suffers from serious brain damage. The second story is about a moral monster.
In both cases, the agents involved will lack second-order Intentions, and we will not ascribe any such quality to them. Yet, I will argue, we would adopt the attitude that the accident victim and the moral degenerate are persons in the moral sense, i. Grundy is caught and brought to justice. It is at least intuitively plausible to suggest that even if we fail to adopt the stance toward him that he is a secondorder Intentional system, we would hold him accountable for his wrong-doings. Pre-analytically there is nothing irrational per se in this supposition. Someone has to pay for his crimes, and he seems the best candidate, having committed them.
And yet if it were a necessary condition for our holding Grundy morally accountable that we ascribe to him second-order Intentions, it would not be reasonable for us to suppose we can blame him.
In fact, we, it seems, would not even recognize him as a being that we could rightfully hold responsible for his actions.
If Dennett is right, we would not consider him a person, and the question of his guilt or innocence is closed.
It would be as mistaken to suppose he had ethical responsibilities as it would to hold that of any non-person, e.g., an adding machine. So either Dennett is wrong, or our ethical intuitions about the conditions of punishment are. This is also shown by the following.
How
is Dennett to account for our notions of strict liability? There are times in which we blame or punish an agent and the question as to whether he has Intentions does not even arise. An employer is liable for damages to his employee, whether or not we hold he had any Intention to commit the injury. And in times past, we have held in
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the Anglo-American legal tradition that horses were liable for throwing their Masters. And the only consideration was whether the animal in fact did the act, not whether we held that he have second-order Intentions.
Not only do we punish agents we hold lacking in second-order Intentions, we ascribe to them rights and responsibilities.
Except metaphorically, we do not think a corporation has Intentions of any kind, yet we give it rights and liabilities. We also praise it when it has done something worthy, and blame it when it has done something reprehensible.
So
given our ordinary ways of ascribing moral personhood, i.e., of holding an agent accountable with rights and responsibilities, the question of whether or not we hold the agent to be a first-order, much less a higher-order Intentional system, is irrelevant.
So we pay a high price, if we accept Dennett's view over our ethical intuitions, for we will have to substantially revise our ordinary notion of moral personhood.
And even if we are willing to do this, it remains a fact that Dennett has not explicated our concept of a person, but rather legislated it.
So it seems from the above that Dennett is wrong in thinking that an Intentional stance which ascribes secondorder
Intentions to an object is a necessary condition of its being, at least in the de dictu sense, a person.
For there are some examples ~Tn which (a) we adopt a stance toward X that it is morally accountable with rights and responsibilities, thereby, on Dennett's view, constituting it as a person, and (b) we fail to adopt the Intentional stance that the same X have second-order Intentions.
But let us suppose that the above objections are not sound. Even so, Dennett is in for trouble. For it seems that his criteria for moral personhood may be at once too broad and too narrow.
It would seem that it is simply a matter of attitude whether an object is an Intentional system in the de dictu sense.
That is, the question as to whether the thing really has Intentions or not is, in some crucial way, irrelevant to its being a person in this sense. Partly this is because the concept of Intentional system is normative, that is, no object may in fact make the grade and be one. So if the factual nature of an object were relevant to our ascriptions of personhood, we would, if we did the rational thing, suspend judgement on whether anything was a person. But for Dennett it is not rational to so refuse to judge.
So the factual nature of the objects cannot matter to our adopting the Intentional stance.
Whether we behave toward an object as if it were an Intentional system is, then, in the de dictu sense, constitutive of its being an Intentional system. But then, why cannot we justifiably ascribe second-order Intentions to subhuman animate objects? It seems we can of some, for we do so, or fail to do so ad libitum for dogs, cats, even trees and ivy plants. But then, why cannot we do so for some inanimate objects?
For Dennett, we in fact do so in the case of computers. We can also think of examples from our daily lives. And what of second-order volition? This is simply a special case of ascribing second-order Intentions. Although we cannot say, thereby, that the same license applies here (that would be the fallacy of division), it seems equally plausible, on Dennett's view, to ascribe these volitions to the same class of objects that we have ascribed second-order Intentions too.
At least we can ascribe second-order volitions to inanimate objects. My television goes on the blink. Now, I know that certain sonic vibrations can bring about the set's return to good order. I also know that these sonic vibrations will be set off by an angry tone of voice and the sounds of my saying "You'd better shape up or else." (This is electronically feasible.) But instead of this mechanistic interpretation, I explain the phenomenon by the following.
I
think that the television intends to upset me by going on the blitz. But it knows by the tone of my voice that 1 am angry and will intend to harm it, if it does not shape up. It desired that its wishes upset me, but it is sorry and changes. This explanation does the following: a) it ascribes second-order Intentions to the television (It knows I am angry), b) it ascribes second-order volition to the set (It desired that its wishes upset me), c) it predicts the television's behavior. So Dennett would have to say the ascription of second-order Intentions and vglitions is proper for at least some inanimate objects.
But we can force Dennett to say that we are able to, with propriety, adopt fi a higher-order Intentional stance toward all objects. This is to say the following: By "higher-order Intentional stance" I mean any attitude which ascribes higher-order Intentions, namely, at least first-order Intentionality, reciprocity, and second-order volition, to an object. We know that for Dennett we are justified in taking a higher-order Intentional stance toward an object if we can, using higher-order Intentional predicates, predict or explain its behavior. That is, if we can give a teleological explanation with predictive value of a thing's behavior in terms of first and secondorder Intentions and volitions, then we can properly adopt the higher-order Intentional stance toward that object. But arguably we can so understand the behavior of any object..
The above examples indicate at least some inanimate object's behavior can be explained teleologically, and it seems entirely arbitrary to exclude from the possibility of higher-order teleological explanation the behavior of any class of objects.
How do we explain or predict the behavior of physical objects? We try to show that the behavior is an instance of an observed law-like regularity.
For example, we notice that when two objects are contiguous, the one with the greater mass will attract the one with the lesser. We explain or predict this pheneomenon on the basis of the law-like regularities which we call the laws of gravitation.
But such law-like regularities are describable teleologically.
For example, "When two objects in space love each other and are self-aware of the feeling, they will intend to please each other by varying the gravitational attraction inversely with their distance and directly with their mass." And any time we witness the statistical or constant conjunction of event A with event B, we are licensed to predict the latter given the former. But we can equally well predict event B by talking of its self-conscious love of event A and its desire to please the latter. Evidence of these feelings is, of course, the fact that the two events are frequently or always, like two friends, contiguous. And what other rightful restraint could there be in ascribing the status as a higher-order Intentional system to an object, other than the one that the ascription is false, because the object de re is not a higher-order Intentional system? So it seems Dennett is committed to saying that the class of objects we corisider higher-order Intentional systems is, in principle, co-extensive with the universal set. That is, it seems that we can justifiably adogt the higher-order Intentional stance toward any object." 
Now
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And at the very least, our pre-analytic inclination is to say a theory of personhood is false which has as its conclusion that we may be mistaken about our own personhood. We would not ordinarily be inclined to say that the theory is true, and that we possibly are not persons, or that we cannot know that we are such, as all the evidence is not in (namely, knowledge of future advances in science).
I take it we intuitively believe that if we know anything, we know that we are persons. Nor could Dennett get around this by saying that if his concept proved empty, there would still be metaphysical, but not moral persons. Although this may be true, it is irrelevant. Presumably, our intuitions are that we cannot be mistaken that we are beings which have rights and reponsibilities and are morally accountable.
In conclusion, if Intentional stance is constitutive of personhood, then Dennett has mis-characterized the attitude involved.
In particular, we need not adopt the stance that an object is a second-order Intentional system in order for us to adopt the stance that it is a person in the moral sense. However, regardless of the answer to the guestion on how to characterize the stance in which we hold an X to be a (4) and (6) and the fact that applying these criteria to a thing is a matter of stance.
Q
See note 8. 10 That is, there may be no object which de re meets the appropriate description.
